Evolution of Rural Development Strategies and Policies
Lessons from Côte d’Ivoire

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Document de travail ART-Dev 2016-2
October 2016
Version 1
Abstract
This country case study has been financed by the OECD Development Centre, in partnership with Korean authorities, for the preparation of its Rural Development Policy in Perspective: From Challenges to Strategies and Action. Since gaining independence, Côte d’Ivoire has achieved a significant economic record. The country developed a powerful agro-industrial sector, resulting from a strategic vision where the state engaged in voluntarist public policies, including both sector development and spatial planning. The cornerstone of this development was an integrated commodity chain or filière approach, articulating research and extension services with dedicated and specialized organizations. Over the last decades, rural development per se was never a priority for public policy. Rural development was a side, but effective, result of agricultural development through rising farm incomes. The economic and political crisis prevented any possibility of reinvesting significantly in the provision of public goods in rural areas, and the gap with cities remains important today. The experience of Côte d’Ivoire is a clear reminder of the importance of risk reduction for the development of agriculture, but also that successes in agriculture are not enough for rural development.

Keywords:
Structural Change, Rural development, Ivory Coast

Résumé
Cette étude a été financée par le Centre de développement de l'OCDE, en partenariat avec les autorités coréennes, pour la préparation de ses recommandations concernant le développement rural.

Depuis son indépendance, la Côte d'Ivoire a atteint des résultats économiques significatifs. Le pays a développé un secteur agro-industriel puissant, résultant d'une vision stratégique où l'Etat s'est engagé dans des politiques publiques volontaristes, comprenant à la fois développement sectoriel et aménagement du territoire. La pierre angulaire de ce développement a été une approche filière, articulant les services de recherche et de vulgarisation avec des organisations dédiées et spécialisées. Au cours des dernières décennies, le développement rural en soi n'a jamais été une priorité des politiques publiques. Le développement rural est le une externalité du développement agricole liées à la hausse des revenus agricoles. La crise économique et politique a empêché toute possibilité de réinvestir de façon significative dans la fourniture de biens publics dans les zones rurales, et l'écart avec les villes reste importante aujourd'hui. L'expérience de la Côte d'Ivoire est un rappel clair de l'importance de la réduction des risques pour le développement de l'agriculture, mais aussi que les succès dans l'agriculture ne sont pas assez pour assurer le développement rural.

Mots-clés :
Changement structurel, Développement rural, Côte d'Ivoire

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Introduction and methodology

This country case review on Côte d’Ivoire is a desk study which was completed by a five-day mission in the country from May 25 to 29, 2015. The mission included Bruno Losch (Cirad) and Vicente Ruiz (OECD Development Centre). It focused on interviews and meetings with major stakeholders from the government (ministries), public agencies, public–private partnerships and private platforms, research institutions, and donors. The organisation of the mission benefited from helpful support from the Prime Minister’s Office.

The report was prepared by identifying accessible documentation – major policy documents and relevant research work (see bibliography) – and by using international databases (e.g. WDI, FAO, UNCTAD, and Comtrade) and national websites resources, when possible. Accessing information, and particularly reliable data and long-time series, was a major difficulty. This constraint, as well as the short time allocated for this work, created a drawback for an in-depth analysis of rural development policies in the country and prevented any effective assessment of their outcomes.

As a consequence of these limitations, the adopted methodology was to engage in a periodization of rural development policies and agricultural policies, the latter being a major component of rural development, attributable to the weight of agriculture in the rural economy. The identified policies were put into perspective within the broader context of national development strategies over the last fifty years. This approach made possible a sequencing of successive policies and the presentation of their rationale, orientation, objectives and major characteristics. This overview of successive public policies was completed by a review of insights on what have been the major developments in rural areas with regard to productive sectors and rural welfare.

The report is organised as follows. The first section sets the scene and presents the major characteristics of the country with regard to its geography, political system and administrative structure, demography and population, and macro-economic trends. The second section proposes a sequencing of development strategies since the 1960s with relation to national and international dynamics. The third section discusses the evolution of agriculture and rural development policies within the overall development framework. It is followed by a tentative review of the major rural development outcomes. The last section proposes main lessons learned from Côte d’Ivoire’s experience.
Section 1. Country profile

1.1. Main geographical characteristics

Côte d’Ivoire is a nation in West Africa (5° to 10° N) of 322,460 km², with a 520 km coastline on the Gulf of Guinea. The major part of the country comprises a low-altitude plateau (between 100 and 400 m), the exception being a mountainous region in the west along the border with Guinea and Liberia. The climate ranges from equatorial in the south to semiarid tropical in the north. The country presents three agro-ecological zones (FAO, 2005):

- In the south, the Guinean zone represents 50% of the territory. It is the rainiest zone, with more than 1500 mm annually (2200 mm in the southwest), where most of the tropical forest is situated – or remains, such as it is, owing to the timber industry and the enormous development of cocoa production. This is the region of perennial crops: cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, and coconut.

- In the north, the Sudanese Zone (31% of the territory) has a rainfall regime in the range 800 to 1200 mm. It is a savannah region, dedicated to dry cereals, groundnut, cotton and livestock.

- The Sudanese–Guinean zone is in between, and comprises 19% of the country. It receives 1200 to 1500 mm of rain, but the rainfall regime can be erratic (with droughts and floods), which results in significant risks for farming.

Cocoa farming has been a major driver of deforestation in the southern part of the country over the last sixty years. Deforestation, which dramatically increased in the 1970s when it reached 300,000 ha per year, was estimated at around 100,000 ha per year in 2000. As a result, the forest area decreased from 8.3 million ha in 1955 to 1.7 million ha in 2008 (RCI, 2010; SOFRECO, 2009). By replacing forest with plantations over vast areas, farmers most probably contributed to the further drying of the climate, even if the causality is uncertain (Ruf et al., 2015). Further drying could contribute to the decrease of cocoa production which is the backbone of Ivorian agriculture and of the country’s economy, with Côte d’Ivoire being the world’s leading cocoa producer.

1.2. Political system and administrative organisation

Côte d’Ivoire has been an independent nation since 1960. It has a presidential regime (the president is elected every five years) with a government led by a prime minister (since 1990). The legislative system is based on one assembly of 225 elected members, dominated today by a coalition supporting President Ouattara (elected in 2010) and includes two major parties: Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) of former President H.K. Bédié.

The country faced a decade of political turmoil resulting from a coup in 1999 and ended in a civil war, when President Gbagbo (elected in 2000) refused to accept his defeat in the 2010 presidential election which won by A. Ouattara. Governance indicators strongly deteriorated during Gbagbo’s years, due to a rebellion in the North, an economy of war, and the quick degradation of public services. However, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), Gbagbo’s political party that boycotted the 2011 legislative election, maintains a considerable popular backing in parts of the country. Its formal self-exclusion from the political scene, a difficult reconciliation process due to slow justice for civil war crimes, recurring corruption – even though significant improvements have
occurred over the last two years – and poor delivery of public services in several regions are risks to political stability. Nevertheless, the next presidential election, due in October 2015, should take place smoothly. President Ouattara, who has a good economic record and international support (EIU, 2015), will not face any real challenger: L. Gbagbo is held under arrest by the International Court of Justice and FPI lacks an effective successor, while H.K. Bédié maintains the coalition with RDR.

The country has fourteen districts, divided in thirty-one regions which are subdivided in départements. The region is simultaneously an administrative unit and a decentralised level, with an elected regional council which is a consultative body. There are two autonomous districts for Yamoussoukro, the capital city, and for Abidjan, the major economic hub and former capital. This organisation results from a simplification and rationalisation (in 2011) of what had been a progressive complexification of the territorial structure in the 2000s, with nearly 90 councils at the département level – a situation motivated by political objectives and the opportunity to give access to political positions.

1.3. Demography and population

The population of Côte d’Ivoire has increased more than sixfold over the last fifty years, growing from 3 million in 1960 to 20 million in 2013. With a growth rate of 2.3% in 2012, the population is expected to grow twofold in the next 35 years and should reach 44 million in 2050 (UN medium scenario). In spite of this strong growth, Côte d’Ivoire is among the few SSA countries which has experienced a demographic transition – a process illustrated by a significant decrease of the fertility rate, from nearly 8 births per woman in the early seventies to less than 5 now (Figure 1).¹

The country has one of the highest immigration ratios in the world, which has been fuelled by a steady flow of immigrants over the last 50 years. With an average of 200,000 immigrants per year, net immigration reached 430,000 in the early 1980s. As a consequence, the country’s population included 15% of immigrants at the end of the 1990s (1998 census) and the population from foreign origin (including the second generation of migrants) was estimated at 25–30% of the total population before the eruption of political events – the immigration issue in a context of economic stagnation being part of the crisis. Immigration strongly dropped in the 2000s owing to the political context, the military conflict and the division of the country. Net immigration was even negative between 2001 and 2011 (between -250,000 to -400,000 per year in the mid-2000s), which had a direct impact on the population growth rate (OIM, 2009).

¹ The ratio was estimated at 4.6 in the 2000s (WPP, 2010) and is estimated at 4.9 now. This rise, which can be explained by the consequences of the deep political crisis of the last decade, should be short-lived with regard to what the trend has been over the last 30 years.
In 2015, the share of youth under 15 years old was estimated at 41%, and 61% for the portion under 25. As consequence of the on-going demographic transition, the activity ratio is improving. With 1.23 active people for 1 inactive, which is higher than the 1.15 average observed in sub-Saharan countries, the country should reach a ratio of 1.65 in 2050 and begin to benefit from a demographic dividend, potentially fuelling its economic growth (Figure 2). However, this positive evolution results in a challenging increase represented by the yearly cohort of youth entering the labour market every year. Estimated at 430,000 per year today, the cohort’s size should reach 800,000 per year in 2050. In the next 10 years, the country will have to provide job opportunities to 7 million youth, and they have already been born (Figure 3). This is a real challenge for a country recovering from a deep political crisis where sources of employment are limited. Nearly half of these new workers would live in rural areas, putting an additional pressure on natural resources.

**Figure 1 – Evolution of population growth and fertility rates**

Source: WDI

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**Figure 2 – Evolution of the activity ratio (1960-2050)**

Source: WPP

**Figure 3 – Estimated labour market entrants (1950-2050)**

Source: WUP
Côte d’Ivoire is among the SSA countries where the urban tipping point had been reached at the end of the 2000s. With an urban population of around 55% today, the distribution of the people between urban and rural areas went through a major change, when compared with the SSA average (Figure 4). The urban growth was very high in the 1960s–1980s (7 to 10% per year) and then slowed down as a consequence of the economic crisis in the 1990s–2000s (3 to 4%).

The country has one big city: Abidjan, the main economic hub and harbour, with a range of 4.5 to 5 million inhabitants today. The second city, Bouaké, in the central part of the country, has around 700,000 dwellers, while San Pedro, the second harbour, is estimated to have around 350,000 inhabitants, and Yamoussoukro, the capital, around 280,000. It indicates an asymmetric urban structure, with a primacy index of 6.3.

**Figure 4 – Evolution of the rural urban distribution (1960-2013)**

Source: WDI

1.4. Main macro-economic characteristics

Côte d’Ivoire was for long the country of the “West African miracle” and the cornerstone of the stability of the region. The miracle years were the sixties and the seventies, when a booming agricultural sector and the development of manufacturing and services in Abidjan resulted in the GDP growth several times exceeding 10% per year and in a fourfold increase of its value (from 3 to 13 billion in 2005 US$). The collapse of the international prices of cocoa and coffee – the backbone of the economy – in 1979, combined with a growing debt related to major public and private investments, led to a strong recession (with a -11% dip) in 1980, followed by a long 15-year stagnation when the country had to engage in difficult structural reforms (Figure 5). The devaluation of the CFAfr\(^2\) in 1994 gave the country respite, which was however short-lived: growing political tensions led to the 1999 coup, followed by 10 years of political crisis with successive recessions and military conflicts. The oil industry, which developed offshore from the 1980s, started to take off in the 2000s and even overtook cocoa in government’s export revenues, but it has contracted since then.

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\(^{2}\) Previously pegged to the French franc, the CFA franc is now pegged to the euro at CFAfr655.96 for €1. The 1994 devaluation rate was 50%.
The new political regime, following after the chaotic presidential election in 2010, gave a new start, and the country is catching up with a yearly growth rate of 8 to 10%. The government’s objective is to have Côte d’Ivoire become an emerging nation by 2020. This ambition is supported by a robust internal and external demand, important public and private infrastructure investments related to reconstruction after years of conflict, and a strong backing by donors, as well as good commodity prices and international forecasts. It is, however, confronted with the challenge of an inclusive growth model which is inescapable because of an impoverished population and a demanding, growing youth.

Indeed, one major consequence of the “lost decades” has been the collapse in the country’s wealth per capita (Figure 6). After being in the leading pack of African best-performing countries – with 1 800 US$ (constant 2005) in 1978 – Côte d’Ivoire is back at the SSA average. The GDP per capita had nearly halved and dropped to 1 000 US$ in the 2000s, which is equivalent to the level of the early 1960s.

**Sector shares in GDP and employment**

The power engine of agriculture was the source of the quick take-off of the country in the sixties and seventies. The government had early engaged in a policy of import-substitution. It resulted in a progressive development of manufacturing, which reached 15% of the GDP in the 1980s before decreasing more recently as a result of the overall context. Extractive industries have developed with oil and gas, and gold production has been growing more recently. As in other SSA countries, the agriculture-generated activities in trade and transport, as well as the strong urbanisation process, led to a
speedy development of services, mainly in the informal sector. Over time, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 50% in 1960 to around 25% today (Figure 7). The same trend is observed in the agricultural sector share in total employment, which sharply declined from 82% in 1960 to 38% in 2010 (FAO). This evolution, which is very specific with regard to other SSA countries’ trajectories, reflects the importance of the urbanization process in a context where the rural population remains deeply engaged in agricultural activities.

Figure 7 – Evolution of sector contribution to GDP (1960-2013)

International trade and payment accounts
Côte d’Ivoire has an export-led economy and the country has benefited from a positive trade balance in goods since the 1970s. Imports stagnated in the 2000s owing to the political crisis, but caught up quickly as a consequence of recovery and reconstruction. Over time, both imports and exports have represented a high share of the GDP. With the exception of the cocoa crisis of the late 1980s, they stand above 40%, and even 50% for the exports today (Figure 8). Exports are lightly diversified: 11 products account for 75% of the total, but they are concentrated in the agricultural and extractive sectors (oil and gold) with respectively 45% and 29%3 of the exports (2010–2012 average). Cocoa products (beans, paste and butter) reach 32%.

3 Including oil refining activities and the related exports in the neighbouring countries.
Due to its economic success during the first two decades after independence, the country was not then a major recipient of foreign aid. International support came after the devaluation of CFAfr in 1994, but the aid regime was somewhat erratic over time and followed the political events. Between 2008 and 2013, the yearly ODA average was 1.5 billion CFAfr, with a peak at 2.6 billion in 2012. It rarely reached 10% of the GDP (Figure 9). As in other developing countries, ODA focusing on the agricultural sector was limited and remained at between 4 to 8% of the total aid flow. The FDI developed in the 1990s with the first wave of privatizations and then declined similarly during the crisis. The country being mostly an immigration country, remittances from abroad are limited.
Figure 9 – Evolution of ODA, FDI and remittances

Source: UNCTAD and WDI
Section 2. An overview of development policies since the 1960s

Côte d’Ivoire is a somewhat unique case in the context of the long-standing debate on African development. The country of the “miracle” years, which was an international reference point for the success of the liberal way of development in the sixties and the seventies, progressively went down a three-decade path of ordeal, ending in a civil war. This decline of the country fully results from the interplay between internal and external factors. The end of the political crisis in 2011 and a quick recovery show the resilience of the Ivorian economy and society which, however, face critical challenges.

The development policies of the country can be sequenced in three major periods (Figure 10). The first one is rooted in the 1950s, before the independence, which were the foundation of a close partnership between foreign interests and the governing elite. The second period corresponds to the time of successive adjustments, with a slow reform process in the 1980s finishing in a dead-end with the “cocoa war” of 1988–1989. It resulted in deeper reforms and an ambitious privatisation programme, facilitated by the devaluation of the local currency. The third period is one of political crisis, exacerbating all the political, social and economic tensions of the Ivorian society. The last years are a new start, resulting from the deep crisis faced by the country, and they now prepare a new phase of Côte d’Ivoire’s political economy.

2.1. The Ivorian model of public-private partnership

The 1950s presented the critical juncture of Côte d’Ivoire (Losch, 2000). This was the time when the national political elites, after an attempt to develop a formal association with France (with a Union first and then a Community), prepared independence in close collaboration with French private interests and, more broadly, the West. This specific framework, implemented at a time of raging competition between West and East blocs in Africa, was facilitated – and made possible – by the outstanding longevity in power of the first Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

This close collaboration was formed through several choices. The first was to simultaneously adopt economic planning as a major tool for national development and to facilitate the implementation of foreign enterprises – French and then European (for instance, the first Nestlé coffee factory in Africa). Favourable conditions were given to private investors, with a generous investment code (e.g. transfer of profits and tax breaks), the counterpart of which was political and financial support to the country. This secured and supportive environment helped Côte d’Ivoire to engage in the transformation of its agricultural products and to start an agro-industry in parallel with more limited import-substitution activities. The state also became an entrepreneur and

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4 Houphouët-Boigny held the first role in Côte d’Ivoire, from 1945, when he was elected a deputy to the French National Assembly representing Côte d’Ivoire, to his death when president serving for a seventh term. In the 1950s, he was also a full-rank and state minister of the French Republic.

5 Successive development plans were prepared between 1960 and the mid-1980s. The experience stopped with the 4th five-year plan (1981-1985) as a consequence of the implementation of structural adjustment policies.
developed state enterprises or joint ventures with private investors to speed-up the process.

The second choice was to deepen the country’s specialization in agriculture. Côte d’Ivoire had been assigned to coffee production under the colonial regime. Thanks to good natural conditions and land resources, the government decided to continue with its competitive advantage in growing perennial crops. Cocoa, which had a higher development potential, was quickly added as the second pillar of Ivorian agriculture, but crop diversification was the major objective of the government. The country started to develop new products with state investment and public–private partnerships in cotton, rubber, oil palm, pineapple, bananas and others. The investments were not limited to production and included primary and secondary transformation.

The third choice was to support the overall viability of the model through a broad economic openness to foreign capital, as well as to migrant people. A huge amount of French and foreign technical assistance was provided to private businesses and to the Ivorian administration. Above all, borders were fully open to migrants from neighbouring countries, mainly Haute-Volta (today’s Burkina Faso) and Mali, and also other French-speaking African countries. They provided the manpower for agricultural development and these foreign workers were granted full access to the land, which was the major incentive for a spectacular growth of the “plantation” economy. This state-led capitalism was successful and resulted in high economic growth rates, supported in the 1970s by booming international prices of coffee and cocoa. The country beat Ghana and became the first world producer of cocoa in 1977 – a rank it has been keeping since then, being the only African country leader on a soft commodity market. Côte d’Ivoire also benefited from a regional dynamic where the economic collapses of Guinea and Ghana strengthened its own position.

2.2. Crises, reforms and adjustment

History shows that the Ivorian miracle was fragile. In the early 1980s, the country faced a remarkable reversal which can be explained by its significant openness and integration within a quickly changing international environment. The first trigger was the collapse of international prices of coffee and cocoa, which put the country under financial stress due to a growing debt related to significant and sometimes unrealistic public investments. This led to a first structural adjustment plan in 1980, but the situation worsened quickly owing to a second and major crisis on the international cocoa market with sinking prices. In addition to an adverse US dollar–French franc (and CFAfr) parity, this new shock brought the country to its hands and knees after its attempt to fight with the international market during a 27-month cocoa war. In Côte d’Ivoire, which had played games with the first structural reforms, was constrained to move seriously towards adjustment measures. The most symbolic one was probably the government’s decision to halve the cocoa and coffee farm gate prices – an IMF condition for the support agreement of July 1989. In the following years, international donors’ conditions were strengthened towards achieving deeper liberalization and privatization. The cocoa sector reform was the cornerstone of a ten-year fight between the government and international agencies which ended with the suppression of the marketing board – the powerful Caistab (*Caisse de Stabilisation*) – in 1999.

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6 In constant value, the international cocoa price dropped at its 1946 level.

7 Between 1987 and 1989 the country, bolstered up by its position of first cocoa world producer, banned all its cocoa exports in a desperate effort to pull up market prices. In vain.
The 50% devaluation of the CFAfr in 1994, broadly motivated by the chaotic economic situation of the CFA zone – the Ivorian economic crisis being its first motivation – provided significant room for manoeuvre to the economy. It supported the privatization process and helped to start new investments in infrastructure after 15 years of recession. The government launched the “12-work program of the African elephant” (the elephant being the symbol of the country) with the objective of catching-up to the international competition. The momentum was, however, short-lived because of successive governance issues (e.g. leading to a ban on EU funded programmes) and growing political tensions.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire was downgraded twice: on the economic side by the new competition related to globalization, and on the geopolitical side as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, which led the country to lose its status of “representative” of the Western powers, backed by France. It resulted in diminishing support, in parallel with growing economic difficulties, and in the inability of an ageing political regime (the president was in his nineties) to take adequate decisions quickly. The consequences were growing tensions within the Ivorian society, characterized by a battle for political power when the Founding Father passed away and by widening fractures between regional brotherhoods, nationals and foreigners, Christians and Muslims and, in the end, North and South, pointing at immigrants who had broadly contributed to the initial Ivorian success (Losch, 2004).

2.3. Conflict and recovery

Standard reforms missed the specificity of the crisis rooted in the political economy of Côte d'Ivoire. The military coup in December 1999, in a country exemplified for its stability, opened up a Pandora’s box. Political manoeuvring removed the main challengers from the following 2000 presidential election, notably President Bédié, the successor of Houphouët-Boigny ousted by the coup, and Alassane Ouattara, former Houphouët’s prime minister who was pointed out as a “foreigner”. Laurent Gbagbo won chaotic elections wracked with violence; a rebellion was sparked in 2002 and led to the breaking-up of the country between a rebel North and a legal South, with years of failed negotiation rounds for peace; and the postponed 2005 presidential election was finally held in 2010. It ended in a total chaos, with a defeated Gbagbo refusing to step down. After several months of war, including in Abidjan, with military intervention of UN and UN-backed French troops, President Ouattara took the oath of office in March 2011.

During the 2000s, the country showed its huge resilience, which is explained by its massive production potential. “Legal Côte d'Ivoire” in the South, under government’s control, continued business as usual, as the war was being kept on hold with a cease-fire and a demarcation line. Sometimes named the “useful Côte d’Ivoire”, it benefited from containing most of the cocoa producing zone (as well as palm oil and a booming rubber sector), a growing offshore oil production, the major agro-industries and manufacturing activities, and also from the two harbours of Abidjan and San Pedro and the direct access to the banking system. Even if privileges, corruption and a deteriorating judicial system were growing issues, the state and public services were still functioning. The situation was, of course, more difficult and chaotic in the North. Basic services were maintained by the legal government to avoid dramatic impacts on the population, and a war economy developed: people deepened the self-consumption pattern of the rural

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8 E.g. wages of public servants in education and health were maintained, even if the lack of equipment and budget was a critical issue; the connection to the electric power grid was never interrupted.
economy; cash was obtained by smuggling agricultural products, mainly cotton and cashew, through neighbouring countries; rebels and their warlords extorted revenues from the circulation of goods and people. During this lost decade, formal economic growth was erratic, between negative and 1 to 3 %, far below the needs of a growing and impoverishing population.

Since the end of the conflict in April 2011, reunification and strong international support through investments and debt reduction have boosted the Ivorian economy. Growth is back at 8 to 10 % yearly increases of the GDP, and the potential of the productive sector, which was marginally impacted on by the political events is apparent. The main damage was experienced in road infrastructure, which was not maintained, and in the deterioration of public services. Rehabilitation of infrastructure is facilitated by donors’ support (Abidjan’s university campus has been fully renovated and reopened) and projects initiated under the former regime have been finished, such the third lagoon-crossing bridge in Abidjan and the completion of the highway to Yamoussoukro. The extension of Abidjan’s harbour facilities is expected to start soon.

The new regime has reengaged with strategic planning. A Plan National de Développement (PND or National Development Plan) has been designed to facilitate the catching-up effort over the 2012–2015 period. The objective is “the triumph of the Elephant”, with the country reaching the status of emerging country in 2020. The plan relies on some features of the 2009 Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP), but stresses the need for national cohesion and regional development for the lagging regions which were affected by the conflict (mainly North and West). The PND’s ambition is to invest around 22 billion US$\textsuperscript{9} relying on private (59 %) and public (41 %) funding (RCI, 2012). The major strategic sectors are: production (64 %), social services – education, health, family (15 %), governance, justice and rule of law (10 %) and living conditions – habitat, water, and environment (9 %).

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\textsuperscript{9} The PND amount is 11 076 billion CFAfr, or 22 billion US$, with an exchange rate in 2012 of 490CFAfr to 1US$. 

Document de travail ART-Dev
Section 3. Agriculture and rural development policies in practice

Over the long period and with the exception of isolated short-lived programmes, it is impossible to separate a genuine specific rural development policy from the successive policy options targeting agriculture, its development and diversification. At independence, the new government decided to base national development on its agricultural potential, and rural development was understood as being a direct return from increasing production through growing farmers’ incomes and public investments based on tax revenues.

Côte d’Ivoire has a very rich institutional history concerning the organizing and supporting of agricultural development. Since the colonial time, the objective was to achieve the modernization of farming systems through the promotion of more intensive practices focusing on yields and productivity. Overtime, dual public policies were implemented. On one side, they included a “laissez faire” policy with light technical support to the development of the peasant economy, based on food crops associated with coffee and cocoa in the South. On the other side, strong state intervention was directed at the diversification of the production pattern, with the objective of strengthening the foundation of an agro-exporting country.

The evolution of the extension system appears as a common theme, which helps to define several periods (Figure 11): a support to commodity chain development or the “filière” approach; an attempt to switch towards a regional perspective broadening the scope to rural development; a standardization characterized by state withdrawal with the implementation of a unique extension body and its privatization; and the return to a filière type of approach today.

3.1. The “filière” approach

Just before independence, the overall development of agriculture was devoted to a specific body: the rightly named Société d’assistance technique pour la modernisation de l’agriculture en Côte d’Ivoire (SATMACI), created in 1958. Its mandate was to provide technical advice and support to producers for all crops and animal production. In order to speed-up the diversification process, and based on its planned vision of development, the government quickly decided to create ad-hoc organizations dedicated to the development of specific areas of production which were considered as the major drivers for rural development.

Several organizations named “sociétés de développement” or “SODE” were created: SODEPALM for palm and coconut associated to PALMINDUSTRIE in charge of oil
production; SODEFOR for timber; SODEFEL for fruits and vegetables; SODEPRA for animal production; SODESUCRE for sugar; CIDT for cotton, etc., and SATMACI focused on coffee and cocoa. All these structures were public enterprises or joint ventures with a private-type management, a board and a CEO, and their own personnel. They were linked with specific research institutions which were dedicated to specific products (for long, these were French research institutes) and were in charge of providing improved seeds and technical recommendations. They were exceptions for *filières* where private enterprises were already in place, mainly rubber, banana and pineapple. In these specific situations, the state would sometimes delegate to them a role of providing support to farmers.

Food crops did not benefit from any specifically dedicated body (with the exception of a SODERIZ for rice, over a short period of time). They indirectly took advantage of other improvements, knowing that farmers were always cultivating staples parallel to coffee, cocoa and the new products. As a result, food production was able to answer the growing demand of an increasing urban population (rice being the major exception).

The support of SATMACI for coffee and cocoa was somewhat limited, knowing that the marketing of products had been fully managed by the private sector since the colonial times, with middlemen and exporters. The role of the state for these two strategic products was limited to: setting the rules (agreements for private operators), setting the prices (with a yearly unique farm gate price and a regulation of downstream costs), and controlling the exports (with a marketing board – the *Caisse de stabilisation* or *Caistab* – taxing and approving the exports depending on a price target). The farm gate guaranteed price, its yearly nominal increase (until the cocoa war), the attentive political support to the “planters” by the President, and the access to land resources for any producer, including from foreign origin, were remarkable incentives which resulted in a booming production.

During this first period, the government engaged in education and health policies, as well as in the improvement of living conditions and transport infrastructures. Rural areas were not specifically targeted but were included within the action plans of sectorial ministries. With the exception of a short-lived *National Agency for Rural Development* (ONDR) created in the early 1970s, and intended to coordinate public interventions, agricultural growth and growing farmers’ incomes were considered as the pillar of rural development.

### 3.2. The tentative regional and rural perspective

In the seventies, Côte d’Ivoire engaged in major spatial planning operations: the creation of a hydroelectric dam on the Bandama River and the related development of the Bandama region in the centre of the country; and the creation of a new harbour in San Pedro and the development of the Southwest region. These regional development programmes were part of a government’s aim to deal with the regional asymmetries of national development resulting in an over-polarisation on Abidjan, the major hub, and in the Southern part of the country, where booming cocoa production was creating a significant income difference over the lagging North. In that perspective, other programmes were initiated, like the “railway cities operation” (providing support to

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12 Two specific bodies were created: the *Bandama Valley Authority* (AVB) and the *Southwest Development Authority* (ARSO). The two operations were directly connected, with population evicted by the Bandama dam and its lake being resettled in the Southwest. The opening up of the deeply forested Southwest region initiated a huge pioneer front and resulted in a sharp growth of cocoa production.
enterprises located in the small towns along the south–north railway between Abidjan and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso – Haute Volta at that time), and the speeding-up of urban planning in regional cities through the organization of the Independence Day (celebrations changing place every year). For the government, however, a major tool was to support the development of cotton production which was intended to bring cash and wealth to the savannah region. It was quite successful and cotton production rose from 35,000 tons in 1970 to 400,000 tons at the end of the 1990s – a success referred to as the “white revolution”.

Starting in 1977, the government engaged in a deep restructuring of the extension system. The main objective was to prevent competition between SODEs which had over time generated inefficiency and overlapping in the same regions. Therefore, it was decided to transfer regional leadership to three existing structures: SODEPALM was assigned the rural development in the South, SATMACI in the middle Côte d’Ivoire, and CIDT in the North, with these regions almost corresponding to their core sectorial mandates (palm and coconut, coffee and cocoa, and cotton). While SATMACI and CIDT added rural development in their respective regions to their own original mandate (coffee and cocoa, and cotton), SODEPALM switched from palm to staple development and rural development in the South. Agro-industrial estates (palm and rubber), as well as specific regional development programmes (AVB, ARSO), were also exceptions to the new regional leaderships and kept their own activities.

As a result, at the end of the 1980s, while the country was facing its deepest economic crisis, it presented an over-complicated structure, combining both regional and sectorial support. In practice, regional development never emerged as an effective approach. Similarly, rural development, in spite of the short-lived creation of a Ministry of Rural Development (1984–1986), remained a “by-product” of agricultural and sectorial growth. Technical ministries continued to develop their own programmes with the objective of improving ratios of population coverage. The experience of the Regional Funds for Rural Equipment (Fonds régionaux d’aménagement rural – FRAR) was somewhat a limited exception. Created in 1974, they were based on co-funding for schools, water access, roads, health centres, etc. and included joint planning efforts between the state and villagers from the same rural area and a shared contribution to the cost of equipment (with a ratio between 40 and 60% for the rural dwellers, more in the richer South and less in the poorer North).

3.3. Standardization and privatization

With the full engagement of the country in effective structural reforms, the extension system was deeply reshaped. After a pilot based on the “training and visit” system (1988), the World Bank implemented a new project in 1989 as part of the structural adjustment plan: the National support project to extension services (PNASA). Its objectives were a standardization of the many existing extension systems and the progressive removal of the many related SODEs. Based on the PNASA, a National Agency for rural development (ANADER) was created in 1993, absorbed the SODEs and started a drastic reduction of the payroll. The ANADER was given the mandate to support the development of agricultural and animal production, as well as farmers’ organizations and the adequate access to inputs. In 1998 the agency, which had been created as a public–private partnership, was fully privatized. The same year, a new land law (Loi foncière) was adopted. Its objective was to clarify land rights in a country were easy land access, informally approved by the state, and
huge internal and external migrations had fuelled growing tensions in a context of deep economic crisis and increasing demographic densities. The law implemented a new definition of land property which was formally limited to the state, local governments and Ivorian nationals, therefore threatening the situation of foreign immigrants. Customary rights were also acknowledged and gave access to a temporary land title (these temporary titles were granted to foreigners in 2004).

In parallel, international donors put pressure on the government to liberalize the coffee and cocoa sectors. Guaranteed producer prices were progressively removed, as well as other administrated costs, and the Caistab had to implement a transparent system for sales management and was finally dissolved in 1999, a couple of months before the military coup.

Following the end of the 44-year rule of the Caistab, the troubled 2000s were mainly marked by the implementation of a private governance for the coffee and cocoa sectors. New bodies were created with representatives from the private sector (exporters, carriers, grinders, and banks), producers’ organizations, and the state: notably the “Bourse du café et du cacao” (BCC), the regulation fund, and the “Autorité de régulation du café et du cacao” (ARCC). The taxation system based on exports remained and the taxation level was particularly high in a political context where governance was often chaotic and characterized by successive scandals (Varlet, 2013). A tentative rationalization occurred with the creation of a new regulation system in 2008 (the “Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao” – CGFCC), which also had the mandate to contribute to the rehabilitation of infrastructure (roads). The taxation system, which had been linked to the exported volume, finally switched to ad valorem and was limited to 22% of the CAF price.

3.4. The renewal of the filière approach

The priority of the new regime in 2011 was to restart Côte d'Ivoire's economic engine. As such, 25% of the Plan National de Développement (PND) is dedicated to infrastructure and transport, followed by energy and mining (15%), and agriculture (8.5%). The investment objectives are based on the Programme National d’Investissement Agricole (PNIA), prepared in 2010, and updated by the Programme d’Investissement Détailé (PID) which was adopted in 2012 as a component of the PND.

Rural development is not addressed per se and is included in thematic actions related to education, health, living conditions, etc.

Parallel to reinvestment in agriculture, efforts were put into redesigning the institutional and regulatory framework, and the clean-up of the coffee and cocoa sectors were at the forefront. In 2012, a new governance structure was implemented with a new regulating body: the “Conseil du Café Cacao” (CCC), jointly managed by the private sector and the state. Among the objectives of this reform were: (i) secure producers’ incomes through a new system of guaranteed price set at 60% of the CAF price – a major difference from the previous systems; (ii) increase productivity with a closer connection to research and the strengthening of agricultural extension; (iii) fight against children’s work; (iv) improve representativeness of producers’ organizations, supported by a review of existing cooperatives; (v) enhance productivity and quality (a 2014–2023 “2QC plan” for volume, quality and growth), and (vi) improve rural infrastructure through the FIMR (Investment fund for rural areas) funded by export taxation. A similar governance structure was designed for cotton, which was extended to the booming production of cashews which had increased tenfold over the last 10 years. The “Conseil
"du coton et de l’anacarde" (CCA) is in charge of coordinating extension and research, and of organizing an effective collaboration between private actors, particularly with regard to prices along the value chains.

After the lost decade, a major orientation of the government is to reengage in an integrated approach to agricultural development, based on multi-stakeholder platforms (or “interprofessions”) in charge of defining vision, objectives and actions, and of articulating research, extension, training and education, as well as agro-industrial development. The rationale for the method is to maximize common benefits instead of having a couple of winners and mainly losers. The cornerstone of this new approach is the filière which is, however, conceived of in a different way than in the booming sixties and seventies when SODEs reigned. Today, the main role no longer has the state implementing its planned vision. The state still plays a role as a go-between, but with the objective of getting as many multi-stakeholder platforms involved as there are existing areas of production in agriculture, animal production, fisheries, and forestry. The government targets around 20 platforms, although only a few of them have been formally implemented so far.

This objective of involving public–private partnerships around shared interests for the development of a specific product does not give specific attention to rural development. Again, rural development appears as a by-product of a growing rural economy based on agriculture. The operational tool of this new approach is the Fonds interprofessionnel pour la recherche et le conseil agricoles (FIRCA), created in 2003 but put on hold owing to the political events. FIRCA is in charge of funding and coordinating research programmes, extension, training, and support to farmers’ organizations. Its interventions are targeted on specific filières and based on the contributions of the filière’s stakeholders. FIRCA also receives support from the government and donors, particularly from the World Bank project on productivity in West Africa (WAAPP). The implementation of FIRCA’s actions is provided through the CNRA (the National Centre for Agricultural Research) and the ANADER, which depend on these product-targeted funds for developing their activities. As a consequence, in spite of its name (rural development agency), ANADER has limited cross-sectorial activities. It only provides occasional support to local governments engaging in territorial planning, but with clear limitations related to existing funds.
Section 4. Main rural development outcomes

4.1. A few reminders about the productive sector

As in other SSA countries, Côte d'Ivoire’s rural economy is all about agriculture. Rural households are diversified, but this is a low return diversification, mainly relying on informal activities in petty trade or handicraft. The biggest villages also conduct activities related to the first transformation of agricultural products (mills, grinders, and shellers), as well as their marketing. This is agriculture which attracts rural dynamics and the elusive rural development policy, has not changed this massive orientation.

Although agricultural policies have led to the development of agro-industrial systems based on estates sometimes associating surrounding individual farmers (nucleus estate system), the farming systems in Côte d'Ivoire are characterised by a peasant economy based on staple crops: cereals in the north, and roots, tubers and plantains in the south. Cash crops (mainly cotton, coffee and cocoa) have over time been associated with the crop system, while staples were also becoming tradable goods with the rise of urbanisation.

In the southern part of the country, the development of the plantation economy based on perennial crops resulted in a new farming system, where slash and burn followed by staple crops and fallow was replaced by slash and burn, staples associated with coffee and cocoa, and then coffee and cocoa plantations. This dynamic led to a continuous extension of cultivated area at the cost of a rapid decrease in area of the tropical forest, and the process was amplified by strong immigration from northern regions and other countries motivated by easy access to forest land and coffee and cocoa.

As a consequence, a large pioneer front moved from east to west (facilitated by the opening up of the Western region in the 1970s) and the agricultural area, notably the area dedicated to perennial crops, increased rapidly up to the 2000s (Figure 12), highlighting the progressive aspect of land reserves (and explaining the related social and political tensions). The area planted with cocoa is estimated today at 3.5 to 4 million hectares.

Figure 12 – Evolution of agricultural land (1960-2012)\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} See definition in annex.
The structural consequence of this dynamic is a very extensive production system where the holding acreage is related to labour availability (family labour of both farmers and tenants) and land availability (depending on the duration of agricultural development and therefore land access). The main production factors are land and labour; inputs use is very limited, as is mechanisation and agricultural infrastructure (irrigation) – see Table 1 and Table 2. The situation is broadly similar in the savannah zone where annual crops dominate, the exceptions being fruits and cashew trees. Cotton, which only concerns a limited portion of the farming system, has led to the progressive development of animal traction and chemical inputs use.

### Table 1 – Agricultural machinery

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of tractors</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>3950</td>
<td>4470</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>5950</td>
<td>8981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDI

### Table 2 – Irrigation development (1961-2012)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total irrigated land (ha)</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>22000</td>
<td>36000</td>
<td>46000</td>
<td>56000</td>
<td>68000</td>
<td>73000</td>
<td>73000</td>
<td>73000</td>
<td>73000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total irrigated land (% of arable land)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO

The association of staple and export crops and the pioneer front dynamic have over time led to a sharp increase in a diversified production. Due to its first rank at the world level, cocoa production overtakes in value the major staple crops: yam, cassava, rice and plantains (Figure 14). This progression of production has resulted in a progressive improvement of the average food supply, with an equivalent of 2 799 kcal per capita/day in 2013, which should prevent undernourishment (Table 3). However, this is not the case owing to unequal food access related to poverty (see below).
Agriculture is the leading sector in exports (Table 4). The sector reached more than 60% of the total until the early 2000s, when the development of oil production led to a decreasing share (45% in 2013). Cocoa retains the first rank and has fully marginalized coffee which was the main export crop at the time of independence. Diversification is a major outcome of a voluntaristic agricultural policy which positions the country as a major agro-exporter in Africa. Natural rubber, cashew and palm oil have risen in shares over the last decade (Figure 15). Share of food in total merchandise imports stands around 10% and has decreased over the last decade due to a combination of improvements in staple production (notably rice in the recent years) and of the consequences of the crisis (with a higher reliance on local food).

Table 3 – Evolution and contribution to food supply (kcal/capita/day)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>2583</td>
<td>2596</td>
<td>2701</td>
<td>2777</td>
<td>2768</td>
<td>2583</td>
<td>2609</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td>2783</td>
<td>2784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetal Products</td>
<td>2193</td>
<td>2434</td>
<td>2417</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>2781</td>
<td>2604</td>
<td>2447</td>
<td>2497</td>
<td>2522</td>
<td>2673</td>
<td>2668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Products</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO

Table 4 – Evolution and importance of agricultural trade

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food imports (% of merchandise imports)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food exports (% of merchandise exports)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO
4.2. Rural welfare

The deep economic crisis and the political events of the last twenty years have deeply affected social indicators. Côte d’Ivoire is a low human development country and, in 2013, it ranked 171\textsuperscript{th} out of 187, after Afghanistan. There is, however, an Ivorian paradox because this situation is not new: the big push of the 1960s and 1970s did not translate into a significant improvement of social services, living conditions and equipment and, in 1980, Côte d’Ivoire was not performing better than other SSA countries with lower GDPs and lower growth rates. Stagnation and crisis prevented any catching-up of these lost decades.

This paradox is particularly significant for rural areas which have been the engine of the early Ivorian economic successes, but which have never received public investments in return according to the worth their contribution to national development. The government never had specific objectives targeting rural areas. Government’s action was to proceed with progressive equipment of the country, following the administrative network and focusing on the administrative centres (the prefectures and sub-prefectures) of every \textit{département}. Most of them received the basic equipment with health facilities, electric power, schools and progressively high schools, but the countryside stayed in its “infrastructure remoteness”. The exception to this marginalization was the patient FRAR programme, co-funded by the rural population.

In addition, North–South disparities came to the top of the rural-urban gap. They are explained by the difference in agricultural dynamics, but also by a “metropolitan bias”: Abidjan deeply polarized the territorial organization of the country, and the southern coffee and cocoa producing regions fully benefited from a dense transportation network and early connection to the power grid.
Evolution of poverty

Due to the strong GDP growth in the 1960s and 1970s, poverty ratios were particularly good in the early 1980s, with only 10% of the population being under the national poverty line (Table 5) – an exception in SSA. Despite a slight economic improvement in 1995–1996, the adjustment and recession in the 1990s led to a dramatic degradation of the average wealth: extreme poverty grew from 8% in 1985 to 30% in 1998, and poverty at 2$PPP from 21% to 57% (Figure 16). The political instability and crisis of the 2000s prevented any improvement and the situation even worsened: at the end of the decade, 60% of the Ivorian population was under the 2$ poverty line, bringing the GDP per capita back to the level of the early 1960s.

Over time, rural areas have always been more deeply affected by the prevalence of poverty, with a 1 to 2 ratio when compared with urban areas. This gap did not increase during the long-standing crisis and in 2008, 54% of rural dwellers were under the national poverty line (Table 5). These aggregate figures, however, mask sharp regional differences. Until 1985, rural poverty was first a common feature of the Northern savannahs, which stood far behind the booming plantation economy in the South. The drop in cocoa and coffee producers’ prices in 1989 led to a dramatic change: with halved prices, poverty spread over the forest zone, especially in the Western region and also, as a direct consequence, in most of the secondary cities. Abidjan was somewhat sheltered until 1993, when public wages were cut, and following devaluation of the CFAfr, private salaries and living standards were also impacted (Cogneau & Mesplé-Somps, 1999). This generalization of poverty led to a decrease of income inequality in the early 1990s (Figure 17), but worsening governance during the years of political trouble led to a new rise of inequality, with a Gini coefficient moving from 32 in 1990 to 42 in 2010.

Figure 16 – Evolution of poverty (1985-2008)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National poverty (% of population)</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>34,6</td>
<td>36,4</td>
<td>40,2</td>
<td>42,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural poverty (% of rural population)</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>48,4</td>
<td>41,5</td>
<td>45,8</td>
<td>54,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban poverty (% of urban population)</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>28,6</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>29,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDI
Social policies and human development

In terms of welfare indicators, the country has not performed well and is lagging with very little progress made over the last two decades (Table 6). An exception is improved water, including in rural areas where nearly 70% of the population has access. This is the result of a long-standing effort which is continued today by the Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP). The situation is markedly worse for sanitation, including in cities (10% of rural dwellers have access). While the country is an exporter of electricity to the neighbouring countries, less than 40% of rural areas are connected to the power grid, and the ratio falls to 15% for several départements in the North. This is an obstacle to the diversification of economic activities.

Côte d’Ivoire has a relatively good road network, when compared with many other SSA countries, with paved roads connecting all main urban centres (the exception being the Northwest region). The infrastructure deteriorated in the 2000s but public investments today prioritise rehabilitation. The situation of the secondary roads is clearly worse, particularly in the northern part of the country.

Table 6 – Evolution of welfare indicators

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved water source (% of population with access)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban population with access</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of rural population with access</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of urban population with access</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of rural population with access</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to electricity (% of population)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of urban population</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of rural population</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
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Source: WDI
With a very low level of education at the time of independence, access being limited to a small urban elite, Côte d’Ivoire speedily engaged in a voluntaristic education policy, including an innovative system of educational TV (télévision scolaire) which was developed in the seventies, targeting rural areas. In the early 1980s, a significant part of the national budget was dedicated to the sector (31%) – a higher share than in many other African countries – but structural adjustment policies deeply impacted on the education budget, which dropped to 22% in 1990–1993 and then to 19% in the late 1990s (Cogneau & Mesplé-Somps, 1999).

The level of gross enrolment in primary school was directly impacted on by the economic crisis, with a reduction in the 1990s (Table 7). It today reaches 96% (in 2013) but this high figure masks a sobering reality, because the average schooling duration remains extremely low, with 2.8 years in 2010 (Figure 18) and also because of regional disparities (the Northwest being again marginalized, with more than half of children not attending school). As a consequence, the literacy rate is bad (40% of the population above 15 years) and has not improved much over the last twenty years (Table 8). The inefficiency of the educational policy has for long been pointed out (Gupta et al., 1997) and it also translates into the very low level of enrolment in secondary and tertiary education institutions. For the Ivorian youth, the 1990s and 2000s were characterised by repetitive disruptions due to civil servants strikes or political events which led to several “blank years” (with no examination and no advancement). Universities were particularly affected. This situation has resulted in a severe handicap for the Ivorian economy and its evolution towards more productive and skilled jobs.

Table 7 – Evolution of school enrolment by education level (% gross)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In primary</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>In secondary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>In tertiary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
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Source: WDI

Figure 18 – Evolution of schooling duration

Table 8 – Evolution of the literacy rate

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<tr>
<td>% of people 15-24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of people 15 and above</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
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</table>

Source: WDI

Health policies and the progressive promotion of preventive care have had a significant impact on infant and child (under 5 years old) mortality rates, which were halved between 1960 and 1980. During the same period, life expectancy increased, on average,
from 37 to 50 years old (Figure 19) but was then directly impacted on by the crisis: Côte d’Ivoire is now behind the sub-Saharan Africa average. As a result, undernourishment worsened, with a twofold increase of undernourished people between 1992 and 2014 (Figure 20). The government has over the last decade been working on the implementation of universal healthcare, and the plan was scheduled to start with a pilot on 4 million people in 2015.

**Figure 19 Evolution of life expectancy in Côte d’Ivoire and SSA (1960-2012)**

![Figure 19](source: WDI)

**Figure 20 – Evolution of undernourishment in Côte d’Ivoire (1992-2014)**

![Figure 20](source: FAO)
Section 5. Main lessons from the Ivorian experience

About development policies

Since gaining independence, Côte d’Ivoire has achieved a significant economic record, based on early choices targeting the full use of its large natural resources and a specialization in agricultural exports. It resulted in a strong productive base which positioned Côte d’Ivoire as a major power engine of the West Africa region. The country developed a powerful agro-industrial sector: it has been the first-ranked cocoa producer in the world since the seventies, but it has also deeply supported agricultural diversification in cotton, oil palm, tropical fruits, rubber (it is now the first-ranked producer in Africa), and more recently, cashew (second-ranked world producer after India). This diversification came about with downstream investments in the transformation of products: among others, cocoa grinding (with a capacity of 700,000 tons), cosmetics and textile industries; and the country hosts some of the agro-industrial champions of sub-Saharan Africa.

This outstanding record results from a strategic vision where the state engaged in voluntarist public policies, including both sector development and spatial planning with the regional development of the south-western part of the country. It also results from a close partnership between the state and the private sector, which included private enterprises and also, and first, farmers. The cornerstone of this development was an integrated commodity chain or filière approach, articulating research and extension services with dedicated and specialized organizations.

Growing political and social tensions arose, starting in the 1980s. They were the consequence of a deepening economic crisis related to: an overspecialization in exports and an adverse international environment (dropping commodity prices and unfavourable US dollar–French Franc/CFAfr parity); a lack of anticipation of the changing context which required improvement in productivity; an underestimation of the critical needs for investment in human capital; and deteriorating governance with mismanagement and successive postponement of reforms. These difficulties were exacerbated by a paralysed political class, swamped in a succession conflict, and by standardized assistance ‘recipes’ from international donors. It resulted in an open political crisis and a civil war, which deeply weakened the overall economy and worsened poverty, with the GDP per capita moving back to the level of the 1960s.

The country is recovering rapidly today, because its large productive agro-export potential remains. The decision of the government to give farmers the biggest share will have a huge multiplier effect. The cocoa sector illustrates the amplitude of this economic impact: with a production at around 1.6 million tons and a farm gate price of 800 CFAfr per kilo, rural areas receive nearly 1,300 billion CFAfr, or around 2.4 billion US$, per year (at the 2015 exchange rate). However, the challenge of structural transformation remains. Effective economic diversification towards higher productivity sectors will condition the emergence of the country ambitioned by the Government in 2020 and its ability to reap its demographic dividend through numerous jobs for a growing labour force.

About rural development

Over the last decades, rural development per se was never a priority for public policy. Rural development was a side, but effective, result of agricultural development through
rising farm incomes. The state invested in infrastructure and services in rural areas, with significant progresses, but somewhat limited results, when compared with the economic potential of the country. Priority was given to production and agricultural diversification, while public policies at the same time had to deal with a growing urban population. The economic and political crisis prevented any possibility of reinvesting significantly in the provision of public goods in rural areas, and the gap with cities remains important today.

In that context, the government decided to reengage in a renewed filière approach, based on the promotion and generalisation of public–private partnerships and the development of multi-stakeholder platforms. Although a national agency for rural development has existed since the mid-nineties (ANADER), it is now fully supporting the specific programmes targeting the development of productive activities through the provision of extension services. The development of infrastructure and services in rural areas depends on decisions made by the many existing product-oriented bodies (platforms, ministries, and agencies) which results in scattered interventions. Some local governments endeavour to engage in planning activities, and ANADER occasionally provides support, but the challenges faced by rural areas – a still-growing rural population, existing regional disparities, and tensions concerning natural resources – all call for more coordination from the government.

**Main cross-cutting themes**

The dramatic success of Côte d’Ivoire in developing its agro-export sector is a strong reminder about the importance of a conducive environment providing the right incentives. Of course, the government has engaged in significant investments for the development of new crops, like palm products, but the massive growth of agriculture, exemplified by the cocoa sector, has relied on a few policy ingredients: a liberal approach with a broad openness, facilitating access to land and migrant labour; a secured price environment which did not prevent high taxation, but was based on ever-growing yearly prices; a guaranteed commercialization based on public–private partnership; and last but not least, strong political support to farmers with a rewarding status and a symbolic and direct relationship between “the planter and the Founding Father of the Nation”. These ingredients were the cornerstone of confidence and reduced the critical issue of risk, which is the major obstacle to investment and diversification of activities.

Ivorian farmers developed the country fully using the natural resources (the fertility potential of the southern forest zone), and using their own labour force, complemented by labour from other regions and other countries. Migrant workers were also granted access to land, providing a multiplier effect that led to an ever-growing agricultural sector which developed without credit, and with little inputs and extension services dedicated to specific crops. It resulted in an extensive growth process with growing output, but low factor productivity.

These choices were successful as long as access to production factors existed (and primary of all, new land), although they became counterproductive when pressure on scarcer natural resources arose. This resulted in growing tensions between local and immigrant population, and rapidly in a political crisis due to the lack of alternatives in terms of employment for a growing labour force.

If Côte d’Ivoire exemplifies the importance of development strategies, which have led to some successes in terms of agricultural diversification and regional development, its
long-lasting economic and political crisis is a reminder of the importance of anticipation, and of capacity to adapt and to engage in necessary reforms. Effective governance is key and the country has faced the consequences of the erosion of the political regime. However, the inability of international assistance to adopt a comprehensive approach to reform, based on the understanding of the major determinants of the political economy, was an additional obstacle.

The experience of Côte d'Ivoire is a clear reminder of the importance of risk reduction for the development of agriculture, but also that successes in agriculture are not enough for rural development. The country has a limited record in terms of improvement of rural welfare and human development in general, and the need for catching-up is a significant challenge in the context of post-crisis reconstruction. Moreover, reinvestment in education and social welfare is also an answer to encompassing challenges related to poverty alleviation, economic diversification and a more inclusive growth process. If the “triumph of the elephant” requires important investments in tangible infrastructure and sectorial programs, it also needs a reinvestment in a long-term vision and development strategy in which local resources will be fully in play. It requires closer interest and support to regional dynamics and the improvement of rural and urban linkages.
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United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD)  

World Development Indicators (WDI)  

World Population Prospect (WPP)  

World Urbanization Prospect (WUP)  
Annexes

Maps

*Administrative divisions*

Source: University of Texas Library
Agroecological zones

Vegetation

- Evergreen forest
- Tropical forest
- Secondary growth
- Deciduous forest
- Savanna
- Swamp

Source: FAO
Additional statistics

Demography

Evolution of rural and urban population growth rates

Source: WDI

Economy

Evolution of consumption shares in GDP

Source: WDI

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Source: WDI
Definition of agricultural land

**Agricultural land** refers to the share of land area that is **arable**, under **permanent crops**, and under **permanent pastures**.

- **Arable land** includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. *Land abandoned* as a result of shifting cultivation is *excluded*.

- **Land under permanent crops** is land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for long periods and need not be replanted after each harvest, such as cocoa, coffee, and rubber. This category includes land under flowering shrubs, fruit trees, nut trees, and vines, but *excludes* land under trees grown for *wood* or *timber*.

- **Permanent pasture** is land used for five or more years for forage, including natural and cultivated crops.

(Source: FAO)
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